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Abstract
We study a financial market adverse selection model where all agents are
endowed with initial wealth and choose to invest as entrepreneurs or financiers, or
not to invest. We show that often a lack of outside finance leads to the emergence
of financial markets where availability of outside finance leads to autarky. We
find that i) there exist Pareto-efficient and inefficient equilibria; ii) adverse
selection has more severe consequences for poorer economies; iii) increasing
initial wealth may cause a shift from Pareto-efficient to inefficient equilibrium;
iv) increasing the proportion of agents with positive NPV projects causes a shift
from inefficient to efficient equilibrium; v) equilibrium financial contracts are
either equity-like or ‘pure’ debt contracts; vi) agents with negative (positive) NPV
projects earn rents only in (non-)wealth-constrained economies; vii) agents earn
rents only when employing pure debt contracts; and viii) removing storage
technology destroys the only Pareto-efficient equilibrium in non-wealth-
constrained economies. Our model enables analysis of various policies concerning
financial stability, the need for sophisticated financial institutions, development
aid, and the promotion of entrepreneurship.
Key words: financial market efficiency, adverse selection, financial contracts,
creation of firms.
JEL classification numbers: D58, G14, G20, G28, G324
Rahoitusmarkkinoiden tehokkuus ja epäsuotuisa
valikoituminen
Suomen Pankin keskustelualoitteita 6/2003
Tuomas Takalo – Otto Toivanen
Tutkimusosasto
Tiivistelmä
Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan rahoitusmarkkinoiden kykyä toimia epäsym-
metrisestä informaatiosta huolimatta. Lisäksi työssä tutkitaan, millaisissa olosuh-
teissa rahoitusmarkkinat suosivat osake- tai velkarahoitusta. Karkeasti ottaen
osakerahoitusta käytetään, jos taloudessa on paljon tuottavia projekteja suhteessa
alkuvarallisuuteen, ja velkarahoitusta käytetään, jos alkuvarallisuutta on runsaasti
suhteessa tuottaviin projekteihin. Mallin avulla voidaan lisäksi tutkia mm. likvidi-
teetin tarjontaa, yrittäjyyspolitiikkaa, rahoitusmarkkinoiden vakautta, ja säännös-
telyn tarvetta.
Avainsanat: rahoitusmarkkinoiden tehokkuus, epäsuotuisa valikoituminen, rahoi-
tussopimukset, uusien yritysten syntyminen
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The aim of this paper is to explore the functioning of financial markets with
asymmetric information when the roles of agents are determined within the
model. In a departure from most of the existing literature, in our model all agents
are endowed with some initial wealth and an investment project whose quality is
their private information. To initiate a project, a would-be entrepreneur needs
outside financing. There is an occupational choice in the sense that agents choose
whether to participate and, if they participate, whether to become entrepreneurs or
financiers. The set-up creates a natural environment to study whether a market for
financial claims emerges in equilibrium, whether the eventual markets are
efficient, and what kind of financial contracts are employed. Our model allows us
to analyze the effects of different shocks to the economy, the need for more
sophisticated financial institutions, and the usefulness of various policies such as
development aid and the promotion of entrepreneurship.
We build on a strong foundation: Since Akerlof’s (1970) seminal article, a
large literature on the effects of asymmetric information on the functioning of
credit markets has emerged (for surveys, see, eg, Clemenz and Ritthaler, 1992,
and chapter 5 in Freixas and Rochet, 1997). While a substantial part of the
literature is in a partial equilibrium setting, the supply of funds is explicitly
modeled in a few influential studies such as Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990)
and Holmström and Tirole (1997, 1998). The literature shares some common
elements, and in particular, two key assumptions: First, there are potential
borrowers with investment projects and potential lenders with funds, but without
projects. Second, potential borrowers have private information about the ex-ante
or ex-post value of their projects, or their choice of effort. In such an environment,
the well-known problems of adverse selection, moral hazard, credit rationing
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981, Williamson, 1987) and inefficient investment levels (de
Meza and Webb, 1987) may emerge. Financial markets may even collapse. It is
the first of the above two assumptions that we relax by allowing the agents to
choose between becoming entrepreneurs or financiers, or not participating.
1
It turns out that the occupational choice of agents mitigates the adverse effects
of asymmetric information. As in standard models under adverse selection, the
financial market may yield interim or Pareto inefficient outcomes, or the market
may collapse to autarky. These observations provide a rationale for more
sophisticated financial institutions than the one that we allow for. But, in stark
contrast, we show that if the economy is initially sufficiently wealthy or has
                                                
1 In the recent literature dealing with belief asymmetry, (eg, de Meza and Southey, 1996, Manove
and Padilla, 1999, and Hyytinen, 2002) the impact of the second assumption on the performance of
credit markets has been scrutinized. Surprisingly little has, however, been said about the first basic
assumption, although its importance is evident from the work of Boyd and Prescott (1986).8
sufficiently productive projects, a simple form of financial market will emerge
endogenously as an equilibrium institution and, for a wide range of parameter
values, the financial market yields a Pareto efficient outcome.
Paralleling Holmström and Tirole (1998), we consider both economies where
the total initial wealth is sufficient to implement all (positive NPV) projects, and
wealth-constrained economies where there is an aggregate shortage of liquidity.
We find that Pareto efficient and inefficient equilibria exist both in wealth-
constrained and unconstrained economies, as does autarky. Contrary to what one
might expect, wealth constraints do not necessarily dilute the performance of the
financial market: Relaxing the economy level wealth constraint may induce the
agents with low quality projects to seek funding, reducing the efficiency of
financial markets (this is reminiscent of de Meza and Webb’s (1987) partial
equilibrium results). Wealth constraints, however, may affect the distribution of
economic rents and forms of financial contracts between agent types: Agents with
good projects may earn rents and use debt contracts in non-wealth constrained
economies, whereas agents with bad projects may earn rents and use debt
contracts in wealth constrained economies.
We also consider how financial market performance depends on the
efficiency of the storage technology. It transpires that the efficiency of storage
technology has only minor effects, except that the scope of the Pareto-efficient
equilibrium in non-wealth constrained economies is increasing in the efficiency of
the storage technology. At the limit where there is no storage technology, the
Pareto-efficient equilibrium disappears.
In addition to the aforementioned articles, our study is also inspired by
Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2000) and Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2001). They point out that both the microeconomic and economy-wide financial
constraints matter for the performance of financial markets, and that the
consequences of traditional financial market frictions – such as moral hazard – are
at their worst at an intermediate level of financial market development or initial
wealth. Our model has a link also to the literature on financial market
imperfections and the occupational choice between becoming an entrepreneur or a
worker (eg, Kihlström and Laffont, 1979, Banerjee and Newman, 1993, Ghatak,
Morelli, Sjöström, 2001, and Kanniainen and Leppämäki, 2002). To the best of
our knowledge, however, Boyd and Prescott (1986) is the only study besides ours
where there is a choice between investing as an entrepreneur and a financier. In
their model agents i) have investment projects whose quality is their private
information and ii) can choose whether to invest in their project or evaluate the
quality of a project. Our model is simpler than theirs in that we do not allow
information acquisition.
We introduce the two departures from the standard partial equilibrium models
of adverse selection sequentially. In the next Section we assume that potential
entrepreneurs have positive initial wealth but, as in the standard models, that there9
are outside investors who do not have a potential project of their own. The model
of this Section comes close to the one in de Meza and Webb (1987). In the third
Section, we remove outside investors and characterize the equilibria and the
necessary conditions for their existence. Most of our discussion rests on a simple
graphical representation of the results: the analytical details are deferred into the
Appendix. In the fourth Section we discuss the effects of different storage
technologies. Policy implications are collected into Section five, and conclusions
into Section six.
2 The model with outside investors
Except for allowing potential entrepreneurs with positive initial wealth, the model
in this Section contains features that are generic in the literature. The economy
consists of a unit mass of entrepreneurs who are each endowed with a potential
project, and a large number of outside investors without a project of their own.
Each projects needs financing of I to be implemented. All agents are risk-neutral
and endowed with assets A, 0 < A < I. We assume that the number of outside
investors is sufficiently large to satisfy the financing needs of all potential
entrepreneurs. This means that the cost of financing is driven to a level where
outside investors are indifferent between investing and not investing. For the
moment we assume that there is a storage technology that converts the assets to a
consumption good at a zero rate of return. In Section 4 we consider an imperfect
storage technology under which A depreciates at rate 1 – , [0,1].
Entrepreneurs’ projects have different success probabilities and conditional
returns. A project that fails yields zero to all agents. A proportion h (0 < h < 1) of
agents are High (H) types who are endowed with a positive NPV project, the rest
are Low (L) types with a negative NPV project. We assume that pHRH > I > pLRL
and RL > RH, where pi is the success probability and Ri the return (conditional on
success) of an entrepreneur of type i, i{H, L}. Project success and wealth (A)
are verifiable, but project type is private information following, eg, Bolton and
Scharfstein (1990). In what follows, we present most of our analysis using a graph
in the (A, h)-space. Natural parameter boundaries are given by h  1, and A < I.
The financial market works as follows. In the first stage, potential
entrepreneurs decide whether to approach outside investors or to resort to the
storage technology.
2 Contract terms stipulate the amount of financing per project
(I  –  A for all), and the conditional payment from the entrepreneur to outside
                                                
2 When there are outside investors, agents who do not become entrepreneurs are indifferent
between using the storage technology and financing entrepreneurs’ projects. Saying that all of
them resort to the storage technology is an expositional decision without implications.10
investors in case of success. Once financing needs have been settled,
entrepreneurs execute their projects in the second stage. Project success is
verified, successful entrepreneurs compensate outside investors according to
contract terms, and consumption takes place.
The choice of potential entrepreneurs can be formalized as an individual
rationality condition. Denoting expected profits for a type i entrepreneur by 
e
i  ,
the IR constraint is
   L , H i , i A R R p B i i
e
i       (2.1)
where superscript e denotes entrepreneurship and RB is the (fixed) payment that a
successful entrepreneur pays to her investors.
Allowing the entrepreneurs positive initial wealth adds one equilibrium type
to the model compared to the standard model. In addition to autarky and a pooling
equilibrium where all L- and H-type agents become entrepreneurs, a Pareto-
efficient equilibrium exists where only H-type agents become entrepreneurs.
3 In
Figure 1 we have depicted the (A, h)-values for which each of the three different
equilibria exist. The standard model where entrepreneurs have no initial wealth













There are two vertical lines in Figure 1: the  ) p p /( ) R R ( p p A ˆ
L H H L H L     -line
and the  ) p p /( ) I R p ( p ) p p /( ) I R p ( p A ˆ A L H L H L L H H H L         -line, and two
IR constraints. Using the terminology of Holmström and Tirole (1997, 1998), the
                                                
3 This is unlike de Meza and Webb (1987), because they assume that RH = RL.11
pledgeable income of the L-type entrepreneurs exceeds that of H-type agents to
the left of Â, and vice versa to the right of the line. This means that no separating
equilibrium is possible to the left of this line. But once the initial wealth becomes
large enough, L-type entrepreneurs’ expected profit from entrepreneurship
becomes smaller than their initial endowment. This happens trivially when A
exceeds pLRL, but, given the equilibrium RB, it turns out that the NPV of L-type
projects is less than A in the whole region to the right of  L LR p A  . Thus, the L-
type IR constraint can be satisfied only to the left of this line. As Figure 1 shows,
the L-type IR constraint is an upward sloping curve, whereas the H-type IR
constraint slopes downwards.
In sum, the pooling equilibrium exists in the upper left-hand corner of Figure
1, autarky exists below the pooling equilibrium, and the Pareto efficient
equilibrium exists to the right of A. Competition between outside investors
prevents the emergence of a separating equilibrium to the left of A. This suggests
that if finance was provided by a monopoly, the economy would reach Pareto-
efficiency everywhere to the right of Â. Note also that as long as (2.1) is satisfied,
both types of agents invest all their funds to their own projects. This rules out
using A as a signaling device to the left of A.
3 The model without outside investors
In the absence of outside investors the amount of funds available for investment is
limited. A natural consequence is that all agents face a choice between becoming
entrepreneurs or financiers. We think of an economy as being wealth constrained
if the total wealth of all agents is not sufficient to finance all H-types’ projects.
Identically, an economy is not wealth constrained if the total initial wealth
exceeds the financing needs of all H-type projects. The diagonal naturally divides
economies into wealth constrained (above the h = A/I -line), and the non-wealth
constrained ones (below).
The financial market works as before. Since we do not allow for financial
institutions that gather and process information, the financial market in our model
could be interpreted as a frictionless (stock) market. In other words, after the
projects have been implemented, the total payments from all entrepreneurs are
divided evenly among all financiers. Thus it is as if a financier buys a stake in the
average implemented project, instead of implementing her private project.
Loosely speaking, it makes no difference whether one envisions a financial
market where some potential financiers come together to finance one or a few
projects (to equate demand and supply within the “coalition”), or a market where
all financiers buy a similar stake in every implemented project. Both result in the
same expected payment to financiers.12
An advantage of such a simple financial market is that it is easy to evaluate its
performance. The market collapses to autarky when all agents resort to the storage
technology and there are neither entrepreneurs nor financiers. In the Pareto-
efficient allocation all or as many H-type projects as possible are financed whilst
no L-type projects are financed.
We define equilibria through the proportion of type i agents that become
entrepreneurs, denoted by i. As i[o, 1], we have a 3x3 matrix of equilibria as
shown in Table 1.
4 It is immediately clear that three out of the nine cannot exist. If
no H-type agent becomes an entrepreneur, the potential financiers’ individual
rationality constraint is violated. Similarly, due to our assumption that A < I, it is
not possible that all agents become entrepreneurs. The remaining six
configurations cannot be ruled out a priori. They consist of autarky and five cases
where financial markets may emerge as an equilibrium outcome. We have named
the five potential equilibria with financial markets according to what occupations
(e = entrepreneur, f = financier, s = storage technology) agents of type i choose.
For example, H
eL
fs (column one, row one in Table 1) is the equilibrium where all
H-type agents become entrepreneurs, and L-types split between becoming
financiers, and using the storage technology.
Table 1. Types of equilibria
L = 0 0 < L < 1 L = 1
H = 0 AUTARKY Not possible Not possible














Notes: i = the proportion of i type agents that become entrepreneurs in equilibrium.
Both Pareto-efficient equilibria are in the first column of Table 1. Of these, the
one in the last row is strictly better than the one in the middle row. Similarly, in
the middle column, the equilibrium in the last row is more desirable than the one
in the middle row. The equilibrium in the last column is the worst of the five
equilibria with economic activity.
Removing the outside investors changes the adverse selection problem. An
equilibrium is now constrained by four conditions. The first are the individual
rationality (IR) constraints we saw before, with a slight modification. Now the
agents compare the expected profits from becoming active, either as an
entrepreneur or as a financier, to resorting to the storage technology. In the model
with outside investors, entrepreneurs effectively only chose between the storage
technology and entrepreneurship. Second are the incentive compatibility (IC)
                                                
4 These nine categories can be split further according to whether all type i agents participate or not.13
constraints of both types’ of agents. By IC constraints we mean the choice
between entrepreneurship and being a financier. The third relationship equalizes
the supply of funds from financiers with the demand of funds by entrepreneurs.
Finally, the contracts used in the financial market are determined by equating the
payments by successful entrepreneurs to the expected compensation for
financiers.
Denoting expected profits for a type i agent from activity j by 
j
i  , the IR
constraints are
   f , e j , L , H i , j , i A
j
i      (3.1)
where superscript e denotes entrepreneurship and f financiership. The IC
constraints are written as




i        (3.2)
Depending on the equilibrium (see Table 1) and agent type, the IC or IR
constraint or both may bind, and the IC constraint may hold strictly one way (eg,
all H-type agents become entrepreneurs) or the other (eg, all L-type agents
become financiers).
The equality of supply (left hand side) and demand (right hand side) of funds
is given by
   ) h 1 ( h ) A I ( ) h 1 )( 1 ( h ) 1 ( A L H L L H H                 (3.3)
where  i and i[0,  1] denote the proportion of type i agents who become
entrepreneurs and who employ the storage technology.
Finally, the expected payment made by entrepreneurs must equal the expected
return received by financiers:
   h ) 1 ( ) h 1 )( 1 ( R R p ) h 1 ( hp H H L L F B L L H H                (3.4)
The term in the square brackets on the left hand side is the expected (equilibrium)
number of successful entrepreneurs while the term in the square brackets on the
right hand side is the (equilibrium) number of financiers. In (3.4) RF is the





H R      for the IC constraints (3.2) shows that RF also captures
the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship.
Since solving the range of parameters where conditions (3.1)–(3.4) hold for
all five equilibria with economic activity (see Table 1) is a straightforward but
tedious exercise, we relegate the details of the calculations to the Appendix.14
Instead, we next consider the equilibrium H
eL
ef as an example and then






ef, H = 1 and 0 < L < 1, ie, all H-type agents are entrepreneurs and L-type
agents become either entrepreneurs or financiers (ie, nobody chooses the storage
technology,  i = 0,  i{L,H}). Since all agents are active, both types’ IR
constraints are satisfied in equilibrium. L-type agents’ IC constraint holds with
equality, whereas H-type agents (weakly) prefer entrepreneurship to being
financiers.
To guarantee that all agents participate, we require that
A RF  (3.5)
The L-type agents’ IC constraint is given by
F B L L R ) R R ( p   (3.6)
The left hand side gives the expected return for an L-type agent from becoming an
entrepreneur and the right hand side gives the expected return from becoming a
financier. As L-type agents split between the two choices, they must be indifferent
between them.
Since all H-type agents become entrepreneurs, their expected return from that
choice must (weakly) exceed that from becoming a financier, ie,
F B H H R ) R R ( p   (3.7)
The aggregate supply and demand for finance is balanced when
 ) A I ( ) h 1 ( h A ) h 1 )( 1 ( L L         (3.8)
holds. Finally, our assumptions on financial market transactions yield the
following equilibrium relationship between the payment by a successful
entrepreneur, and the expected payment received by a financier:
 ) h 1 )( 1 ( R R p ) h 1 ( hp L F B L L H        (3.9)
Conditions (3.6), (3.8) and (3.9) determine the endogenous variables L, RB, and
RF. Solving first for L from (3.8) gives15





The proportion of L-types who become entrepreneurs has to be less than unity.
This is guaranteed by our assumption I > A. As 
*
L   also has to be nonnegative in
H
eL
ef, (3.10) immediately reveals that H
eL
ef can only exist if A/I  (h, 1). In other
words, H
eL
ef cannot exist in a wealth constrained economy (see Figure 2).
Our next step is to use (3.10), (3.9) and (3.6) to solve for the equilibrium
payments 
*
B R  and 
*
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Equations (3.11) and (3.12) suggest for H-types, the payments 
*
B R  and 
*
F R a r e
independent of project outcome, whereas for L-types the payments are functions
of project outcome. One might tempted to think that that the equilibrium financial
contract can be interpreted as a debt contract for H-type agents, but as an equity
contract for L-type agents. The problem with this interpretation is twofold: first,
although entrepreneurs know the type of the contract they have, financiers do not
know it at the level of individual entrepreneurs.
5 Second, the payment from a
successful L-type entrepreneur to her financiers is fixed, although it is a function
of her project outcome (conditional on success). However, we show in Section 3.1
that there is systematic variation of how each type of agents’ payments are or are
not a function of project outcome. To clarify discussion, we in the following label
without implication (and following de Meza and Webb, 1987) contracts that are a
function of project outcome as “equity-like” contracts. The contracts that are not
such functions we call “pure debt” contracts.
After solving for the endogenous variables, we still need to find the parameter
values satisfying the agents’ IR and IC constraints (3.5)–(3.7). The L-type IC
constraint (3.6) binds as they split in their occupational choices. As H-types
strictly prefer entrepreneurship to becoming financiers, and being a financier is at
least as rewarding as resorting to the storage technology, their IR constraint (3.5)
                                                
5 For the same reason, any argument on financial contracting in a pooling equilibrium becomes
moot (see, eg, Stigliz and Weiss, 1981, and de Meza and Webb, 1987).16
does not bind. This means that the relevant constraints are the L-type IR constraint
(3.5) and the H-type IC constraint (3.7). Substituting (3.12) into (3.5) shows that
the L-type IR constraint is satisfied (guaranteeing that no L-type agent stores her
initial wealth) if
 L L L L H
L H L L
R p I p ) p p ( Ih





The H-type IC constraint (guaranteeing that no H-type agent prefers becoming a
financier over entrepreneurship) is satisfied if

L L L H
L H L L H H
R p ) p p (


















I                 A
H
eL
ef does not exist in wealth constrained economies as suggested by (3.10). The
H-type IC constraint (3.14) is a downward sloping line in the (A, h)-space: it cuts
out the vertical and horizontal axes close to the origin, ie, poor economies with a
small number of good projects do not satisfy this constraint. L-types’ IR
constraint (3.13) is a monotonically upward sloping curve that starts at the origin
and cuts the h = A/I diagonal once. Below the curve, some L-types would prefer
not to participate. L-types’ IC constraint binds in non-wealth constrained17
economies (as it should), and H-types’ IR constraint does not bind (as it should
not).
3.2 Existence of equilibria
Following a similar procedure as for the case of H
eL
ef in Section 3.1, we derive
the values of the endogenous variables and determine the necessary and sufficient
conditions for the existence of the six candidate equilibria (see the Appendix). We
first present graphically the equilibria and discuss them. At the end of the Section,
we summarize our main results.
In Figure 3, we employ the labeling of Table 1 to indicate the areas in which
particular equilibria exist in the (A, h)-space.
6 There are two key lines: the h = A/I
diagonal and the vertical  ) p p /( ) R R ( p p A ˆ
L H H L H L     -line. The diagonal not
only divides the economies into wealth and non-wealth constrained ones, but also
is a border of various equilibria in many cases. To the right of the vertical Â-line
the equilibria are unique.
Figure 3.
Â
  IÂ  
PHRH







A h = 1
AUTARKY
Let us first examine wealth-constrained economies, ie, the area above the
diagonal, starting from the right hand side of the Figure. In wealth constrained
economies all available wealth is not enough to finance all available H-type
projects. In the upper right hand corner we find economies having a high
proportion of H-types, and relatively high initial wealth. There, an equilibrium
exists where all L-types become financiers, and H-types mix in their occupations
                                                
6 In the Appendix, we present a separate figure for each equilibrium.18
between entrepreneurship and finance (H
efL
f). All funds are directed into H-type
projects, and therefore the equilibrium is Pareto-efficient.
Moving to the left, entrepreneurship becomes an option to L-types when we
reach the vertical Â-line. Between it and another vertical line, Â(I/HRH), we have
two or three equilibria in the upper part of the Figure. One is the same H
efL
f as on
the right hand side of that line. Another is H
efL
ef where both types mix their
occupational choices, ie, both L- and H-types become entrepreneurs and
financiers. The third equilibrium is H
efL
e where all L-types are entrepreneurs and
H-types mix their occupations between entrepreneurship and finance. Since there








To explain multiple equilibria recall from Section 2 the necessary and
sufficient conditions for the existence of a separating equilibrium. The necessary
condition is that the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship (
*
F R ) exceeds Â,
because then the pledgeable income of H-type agents exceeds that of the L-type
agents. The sufficient condition is that the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship
exceeds the L-type agents’ expected profit from entrepreneurship, ie, that both the
equilibrium payments 
*
F R  and 
*
B R  are sufficiently high. In Section II competition
between outside financiers drove down the equilibrium payments and the
separating equilibrium emerges only to the right of the vertical
) p p /( ) I R p ( p A L H L H L      -line. Compared with outside financing, wealth-





F R  and 
*
B R  are so high that the opportunity cost exceeds
both Â and the L-types’ expected profits from entrepreneurship to the right of
Â(I/pHRH)-line and therefore a separating equilibrium also exists between it and





e where the opportunity cost of entrepreneurship remains below Â and,
accordingly, the H-type agents’ pledgeable income below the L-type agents’.
Between the vertical lines, Â(I/pHRH) and Â, a triangle exists close to the
h = 1 border, where only the Pareto-efficient H
efL
f exists. In this region there are
sufficiently many H-types to raise the returns on financing high enough to prevent
L-types from becoming entrepreneurs. Proceeding to left, once we cross
Â(I/pHRH) financial markets cease to operate except for a small area close to the
h = 1 border. Quite naturally, when h is sufficiently high, the financial market
emerges as an equilibrium institution. The lower is the agents’ initial wealth, the
higher the needed proportion of H-type agents that prevents the collapse of the
financial market.
We then turn to the non-wealth constrained economies – those below the
diagonal, and again start from the right. The first equilibrium, H
eL
fs, is Pareto-
efficient. All H-type projects are financed, and L-types are indifferent between
financing the H-types and using the storage technology. On the right hand side of19
the vertical pLRL-line, the storage technology is by assumption more lucrative
than entrepreneurship for all L-type agents. Because of costly financing (RB > 0),
the storage technology initially remains superior to entrepreneurship for L-type
agents on the left of the pLRL-line.
Going further to left, once we hit the vertical A-line, the equilibrium
changes. The area to the left of the line supports H
eL
ef which is Pareto-inefficient.
Although all H-type agents become entrepreneurs, so do some L-type agents, too.
Below the L-type IR-curve (equation (3.13)), the L-type participation constraint is
satisfied with equality through some L-types opting for the storage technology.
This means that below the curve, the equilibrium is H
eL
efs where all financiers (L-
types) earn only A in expectation, and hence all L-type entrepreneurs also earn
only A in expectation. H-type entrepreneurs’ IC (and IR) constraint is given by
(3.14).
Above the L-type IR-curve, all L-type agents participate and thus nobody uses
the storage technology even though available assets exceed the financing needs of
H-type agents. Demand and supply of funds is equated through some L-type
agents becoming entrepreneurs. H-types’ IC constraint (3.14) and Â(I/pHRH) cross
the diagonal at the same point. To the left these lines, autarky is the only
equilibrium in the lower triangle.
A major observation of the above analysis comes from a comparison of the
results to the standard model with outside investors (contrast Figure 3 to Figure
1). To the right of A the only difference between outside finance and endogenous
finance is in financially constrained economies; there, outside finance allows the
execution of all positive NPV projects. To the left of A the difference is stark:
apart from the upper left hand corner (close to the y-axis), not having outside
investors yields a better outcome than having them. With outside finance, autarky
is the equilibrium for a large range of parameter values for which in our model, a
financial market emerges in equilibrium. In financially constrained economies,
outside finance may lead to autarky where endogenous finance yields Pareto-
efficiency.
To conclude the discussion we investigate whether the Pareto-inefficient
equilibria are interim efficient in the sense of Holmström and Myerson (1983). In





be interim efficient to the right of Â(I/pHRH) because the Pareto-efficient H
efL
f
exists there. To the left of Â(I/pHRH), a social planner cannot induce separation as
the pledgeable income of L-type agents exceeds that of H-type agents. Similarly,





are not interim efficient, because the social planner could achieve Pareto
efficiency by imposing a high enough RB (= (pLRL – A)/pL). This would work20
because in this region the pledgeable income of H-type agents is higher than that
of L-type agents.
7
We summarize the above discussion in the following proposition:
PROPOSITION 1:
a. All logically possible six equilibria exist for some set of parameters.
b. Autarky is the unique equilibrium in both wealth constrained and non-wealth
constrained economies
1) To the left of Â(I/pHRH) and below (A4.18) (see the Appendix for
(A4.18)) and
2) Below (3.14) and to the left of Â.
c. Pareto-efficient and inefficient equilibria exist both in wealth constrained and
non-constrained economies.
d. Except for autarky the Pareto-inefficient equilibria to the right of Â(I/pHRH)
are not interim efficient.
e. Multiple equilibria may only exist between Â(I/pHRH) and Â, and above
(3.14).
3.3 Rents and contracts
We define economic rents as profits in excess of those that an agent would have
earned in her next best occupation; we call informational rents profits to agents of
type i that are in excess of the profits that agents of type j earn from the same
occupation.
8
A moment of reflection and a look at Figure 3 reveal that H-type agents may
only earn economic rents as entrepreneurs in non-wealth constrained economies.
There, except in equilibrium H
efL
ef, they strictly prefer entrepreneurship to other
occupations, whilst L-type agents are indifferent between at least two occupations.
The rents are also informational, as H-type agents earn more from
entrepreneurship than L-types.
                                                
7 If the social planner were allowed to dictate the occupational choices of agents, efficiency could
in some cases be further improved. In the region to the left of Â(I/pHRH), the planner could raise
efficiency by randomly allocating agents into entrepreneurship. This would be feasible when
h  (I – pLRL)/(pHRH – pLRL). Improvements on autarky would also be possible between Â(I/pHRH)
and Â and below (3.14), if the social planner were allowed to randomly select agents to use the
storage technology. With positive probability, a high-enough proportion of L-type agents would be
forced to use the storage technology, pushing the proportion of H-type agents in the remaining
population above the threshold (A/I) needed to obtain economic activity.
8 These are close, but not necessarily the same as the standard definitions, because in our model,
agents can choose their occupation, ie, change from the supply side of a resource to the demand
side.21
Analogously, it turns out that only L-types may earn rents in wealth-
constrained economies. In H
efL
f, L-type agents earn economic rents as their
profits from becoming financiers strictly exceed profits from becoming
entrepreneurs, or of not participating. In H
efL
e, L-types earn both economic and
informational rents since they strictly prefer entrepreneurship to financier-ship
whereas H-types are indifferent between them.
Concerning contracts forms, different predictions have been obtained in
environments reminiscent of ours: in de Meza and Webb (1987), only (pure) debt
is an equilibrium contract form, while in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), equilibrium
contracts are equity(-like) (see de Meza and Webb (1987), pp. 291). As already
pointed out, our model generates both pure debt and equity-like contracts. As
Table 2 shows, there is a clear pattern in how contract form is determined. If
neither ICs nor IRs for agents of type i bind, ie, the agents are on a single
occupation, they have pure debt contracts. If agents’ IC constraints are binding,
their outside option depends on the project return and, consequently, they must
have equity-like contracts. If agents’ IR constraints are binding, their outside
option depends on their initial wealth and, consequently, they must have pure debt
contracts. In equilibrium H
eL
efs, where L-types’ IC and IR constraints bind, they
use equity-like contracts as entrepreneurs and pure debt contracts as financiers.
Entrepreneurs and financiers of the same agent type also have different contract
forms in equilibrium H
efL
ef where both types’ ICs are binding. H-type
entrepreneurs and L-type financiers have equity-like contracts whereas H-type
financiers and L-type entrepreneurs use “inverse” equity-like contracts.
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There is also a link between contractual form and rents: agents only earn rents
when they use pure debt contracts. H-type entrepreneurs are financed by equity-
like contracts in wealth-constrained economies where they do not earn rents but
with pure debt contracts in non-wealth constrained economies when they do earn
rents. L-types earn rents as financiers in H
efL
f and as entrepreneurs in H
efL
e where
they employ pure debt contracts, but H-types have equity-like contracts. We can,
however, draw no inference about causality relationship between rents and
contract form, since they are simultaneously determined as a part of equilibrium.
Since wealth constraints are relative to the amount of positive NPV projects,
one can think that in non-wealth constrained economies the high productivity
projects are scarce in comparison to initial wealth. Our model predicts that in such
economies, financial contracts are pure debt contracts. In contrast, even if absolute
initial wealth is high, economies resort to equity-like contracts when the
proportion of productive projects becomes “large enough”. If the proportion of
high NPV projects is exogenous – as assumed in our model – our model would
predict that both over time and over a cross section of economies, those periods or
countries that can be characterized by a relatively high proportion of high NPV
projects should also be characterized by wide-spread use of equity-like contracts.
We summarize our findings regarding rents and contracts in the following
proposition:
PROPOSITION 2:
a. H-type agents may earn rents only in non-wealth constrained economies; L-
type agents may earn rents only in wealth-constrained economies.
b. H-type agents earn rents only as entrepreneurs; L-type agents may earn rents
as entrepreneurs and as financiers.
c. When agents earn rents as entrepreneurs, economic and informational rents
coincide.
d. Agents only earn rents when they use pure debt contracts.
e. When agents of type i split in their occupational choices in equilibrium, they
use equity-like contracts.
f. A contract can be an equity-like contract for type i entrepreneurs while
simultaneously being a pure debt contract for type i financiers.23
4 Imperfect storage technology
So far we have maintained the standard assumption of an exogenous storage
technology that fully converts the initial assets to consumption goods. The
existence of such a storage technology is vital in the literature that studies the
stability of the banking system. For instance, it is known that removing the
storage technology eliminates bank runs in Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) model
and its variations. To verify whether our findings are sensitive to the efficiency of
the storage technology, we now assume that there is an imperfect storage
technology under which A depreciates at rate 1 – , [0,1].
The only difference to the general model is that the agents’ IR constraints
(3.1) should be rewritten as
   f , e j , L , H i , j , i A
j
i       (4.1)
When  is close to unity, our previous analysis is robust to the introduction of
imperfect storage technology by continuity. As one might expect, however, the
equilibria will change if  becomes small, because all agents are willing to invest
either as financiers or as entrepreneurs even if their returns are small. To get an
idea of the changes, let us reconsider the example of Section 3.1 (H
eL
ef) under an
imperfect storage technology. To guarantee that all agents participate, we require
that
A RF   (4.2)
All other equations remain unchanged except that the L-type IR constraint (3.13)
now takes the form
 L L L L H
L H L L
R p I p ) p p ( Ih
) p p ( Ih R p
A
   

 (4.3)
When  is close to unity, (4.3) remains a monotonically upward sloping curve in
the (A, h)-space. Decreasing  shifts the curve to the right, increasing the range of
parameters where H
eL
ef exists. It can be shown that when  approaches zero,
H
eL
ef exists for all parameter values in the non-wealth constrained region in so far
as H-types’ IC constraint (3.14) holds. This is quite natural, since without a
storage technology, the L-type IR constraint is trivially satisfied.
We now report the changes for the other equilibria when  = 0.  Besides
shortening the discussion, letting  = 0 further generalizes our model. There is no
longer an exogenous storage technology, but the only way to transfer wealth over
time, and to transform it from initial wealth to a consumption good, is to invest24
either as an entrepreneur or as a financier. Although our model lacks the second
investment period, this is similar in spirit to Holmström and Tirole (1998) who
evaluate whether financial markets alone are able to supply enough liquidity.
Figure 4.
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The results of this exercise are summarized in Figure 4 (the calculations are












e exist for larger parameter value ranges. H
efL
f
remains unchanged. Thus, removing the storage technology causes only modest
changes to financial market performance, suggesting that financial markets alone
can take care of transformation of wealth over time. The largest effect is an
efficiency effect: the inefficient H
eL
ef exists where the efficient H
eL
fs used to
exist. As a result, only Pareto-inefficient equilibria exist in non-wealth constrained
economies.25
5 Policy implications
Though there are several limitations
9 to our simple model, we boldly offer some
policy recommendations. The first deals with widely adopted policies that seek to
promote entrepreneurship (see, eg, European Commission, 2001). A
straightforward “policy experiment” is to move the vertical
) p p /( ) I R p ( p A L H L H L      -line to left. This increases the set of parameter
values for which a Pareto-efficient equilibrium exists in non-wealth constrained
economies. The worse is either the return on the successful projects of L-type
agents or the smaller their probability of success, or the higher is the success
probability of H-type agents’ projects, the smaller are the problems created by
adverse selection. In the limit, the expected value of the L-type agents’ projects is
zero; this is practically equivalent to assuming that agent type is observable ex
ante. Our experiment thus suggest that if the policies promoting entrepreneurship
raise the returns on the successful L-type projects without succeeding in making
them positive NPV projects, they may be misguided. This also means that a
progressive tax on firm profits above 
*
B H R R   may help restore efficiency (for a
similar finding, see de Meza and Webb, 1987).
Shocks to model parameters change the values of the endogenous variables
even if the equilibrium type remains the same as before the shock. When the
parameters initially are close to a border, even small shocks may change the type
of equilibrium. It is clear that in our model, decreases in initial wealth may shift





efs), or even to autarky (eg, from H
efL
f to autarky). But it is also
possible that an increase in initial wealth may have the same effect. Think of an
economy that is in a Pareto-efficient H
efL
f equilibrium (point 1 in Figure 5).
Increasing initial wealth may move such an economy to the Pareto-inefficient
H
eL
ef (point 2), if the increase is sufficient to turn a wealth constrained economy
into an unconstrained one. Even substantial increases in initial wealth may result
in such an adverse shift. One could interpret such policies as development aid, as
the increase in initial wealth comes from outside the economy in question. Such
policies will result in an increase of aggregate production, but possibly at the cost
of inefficiency. However, increasing initial wealth is an effective tool in raising an
economy out of autarky.
                                                
9 For instance, future work should consider more than two types of agents, allow variation in
agents’ initial wealth, and render the model more dynamic.26
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In contrast, increases in the proportion of good entrepreneurs always have a
beneficial effect on the economy. Keeping initial wealth constant, an increase in h
either keeps the economy in the initial equilibrium category, or moves it from the
existing equilibrium into a better one. In other words, it is not necessarily
disadvantageous for an economy to be wealth constrained. In our model it is a
relative measure, indicating that the economy has a large number of positive NPV
projects in relation to its initial wealth. Policies that help raising the proportion of
positive NPV projects in the economy are always beneficial, even if they lead to
aggregate wealth constraints.
Finally, let us consider the role for financial intermediaries that collect and
analyze information. In Bernanke and Gertler (1989, 1990) and Holmström and
Tirole (1997, 1998) the financial intermediaries mitigate the moral hazard
problem. In our model where the source of asymmetry is adverse selection instead
of moral hazard, there is no need for complicated financial institutions in the
Pareto efficient equilibria. In this respect our findings contrast with the common
view that moral hazard and adverse selection are qualitatively similar problems.
However, financial intermediaries could improve the functioning of the economy
when we have low initial wealth (autarky), moderate initial wealth (H
efL
ef), or
moderate to high initial wealth and a non-wealth constrained economy (H
eL
ef).
This is in line with the work in financial development suggesting that banks are
important in less developed economies, while financial markets become important
in developed economics (see Levine, 1997, and Allen and Gale, 2001, for
surveys). The welfare-improving prospects of financial intermediaries also
increase when financial markets alone have to perform transformation of wealth
over time (ie, when  = 0).27
Perhaps the most surprising rationale for financial intermediaries comes from
the observation that competitive financial markets can drive interest rates too low
from an efficiency point of view. As in de Meza and Webb (1987), we show in
Section 2 how competition between outside financiers results in the oversupply of
funds for a wide range of parameter values. Such oversupply of funds also occurs
with endogenous finance in non-wealth constrained economies where competition







In this paper we study whether financial markets can endogenously emerge in
equilibrium, whether the eventual markets are efficient, and what the equilibrium
forms of financial contracts are. We take the basic building blocks of our model
from the literature and supplement them by endowing all agents with initial
wealth and allowing them to choose their occupations. In the usual partial
equilibrium setting, the only equilibria are autarky and a Pareto-inefficient
equilibrium where all agents with a project become entrepreneurs. We first show
that merely allowing potential entrepreneurs to have initial wealth may lead to a
Pareto-efficient equilibrium if the initial wealth is high enough. We then exclude
outside investors and find that Pareto-efficient equilibria exist both in wealth
constrained and non-wealth constrained economies, as do Pareto-inefficient
equilibria. Autarky is also an equilibrium, but only for the poorest economies
where agents’ initial wealth is low. In this respect, it makes only a modest
difference whether there are “many” or “few” good projects in the population. We
show that excluding outside investors (mostly) improves the performance of
financial markets, sometimes to the extent that where existence of outside finance
leads to autarky, excluding it yields Pareto-efficiency.
There also turns out to be a link between rents and contracts, and contract type
and the proportion of high-type agents in the economy. Agents only earn rents
when they use pure debt contracts (ie, contracts where the payment is not a
function of the project outcome, conditional on success). When agents split in
their occupational choices in equilibrium, they use equity-like contracts where the
sum that a successful entrepreneur pays to her financiers is a function of her
project’s project outcome. High-type agents may earn economic and informational
rents and use pure debt contracts only in non-wealth constrained economies. In
wealth-constrained economies that have a high proportion of high-type agents,
they do not earn rents and are financed by equity-like contracts, whereas low-type
agents may earn rents and have pure debt contracts only there.28
Our model shows that, in the face of asymmetric information, the simplest
type of financial markets may perform their role in resource allocation and asset
transformation surprisingly well, and that while increasing the proportion of high-
quality entrepreneurs is a remedy for removing inefficiency, increasing the initial
wealth of an economy may not be.29
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Appendix
In this appendix, we go through all possible equilibria besides autarky. For each
equilibrium, we present
– the constraints,
– the equilibrium values of endogenous variables, and
– the equilibrium existence conditions.
We shorten the exposition by using the following notation: p = pH – pL,
R = RL – RH,   = pHRH – I,   = I – pLRL, and W =  +  = pHRH – pLRL. The
definitions have obvious interpretations. Since our approach to solve the model is
rather mechanical, we explain the solution for the first equilibrium in more detail
than for the subsequent equilibria. We also omit intermediate steps as these are









ef is described in the example in Section 3.1, so we first define H
eL
efs and then




efs, all H-types are entrepreneurs
and L-types are indifferent among entrepreneurship, financing, and using the
storage technology, ie, H = 1, L(0, 1), H = 0 and L(0, 1). The situation here
is otherwise similar to H
eL
ef described in Section 3.1 except that L is strictly
positive. This means that (3.5) must hold as an equality, ie,
. A RF  ”L- and H-type IR” (A1.1)
The agents’ IC constraints are as before in (3.5) and (3.7), ie,
. R ) R R ( p F B L L   “L-type IC” (A1.2)
. R ) R R ( p F B H H   “H-type IC” (A1.3)
The economy level “budget constraint” (3.8) becomes
 ) A I ( ) h 1 ( h A ) h 1 )( 1 ( L L L           (A1.4)
“Equality of supply and demand for funds”33
and, similarly, the financial market equilibrium condition (3.9) is
 ) h 1 )( 1 ( R R p ) h 1 ( hp L L F B L L H          (A1.5)
“Financial market transactions”
Conditions (A1.1)–(A1.5) constrains H
eL
efs. Equation (A1.3) restricts the range of
parameters and an equation system consisting of (A1.1), (A1.2), (A1.4) and
(A1.5) determines the values of the endogenous variables RB, RF, L, and L. The
equilibrium value of the expected payment received by financier, 
*
G R , equals A









Upon substituting (A1.1) and (A1.6) into (A1.5) we have two equations, (A1.4)
and (A1.5), that determine the remaining two endogenous variables, L, and L.












































































where the last equalities come from (A1.6).
The equilibrium exists if 
*
L   and 
*
L   given by (A1.7) and (A1.8) satisfy our
initial assumptions that L(0, 1) and L(0,  1), and if the agents’ IC and IR
constraints are satisfied with 
*
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    (A1.12)
Since L-type IC and IR bind by (A1.1) and (A1.2), the fifth existence condition
comes from H-type IC (A1.3). If it is satisfied, H-type IR (A1.1) also trivially
holds. Inserting (A1.1) and (A1.6) into (A1.3) shows that H-type IC holds if
A ˆ A  (A1.13)
Equations (A1.9)–(A1.13) define the range of parameters for which H
eL
efs exists.
Since the critical values of A in (A1.11) and (A1.12) are strictly larger than the
respective critical values in (A1.10) and (A1.9), the binding critical values are
given by (A1.10) and (A1.12). They in turn cross each other at the diagonal
h = A/I. This means that H
eL
efs only exists in non-wealth constrained economies.
In terms of the (A, h)-space, H
eL
efs exists in the area between the vertical lines











I                 A
h = 1
When (A1.12) (which is identical to equation (3.13)) is violated, the H-type IC
changes from (A1.13) to (3.14), ie, to   L L L R pp p h p W I I A       . Thus,
H
eL
ef exists in the range of parameters described in Section 3.1, ie, in the area35
shaped by curve (A1.12), the downward sloping line (3.14) and h = A/I diagonal.
Note also that curve (A1.12), the vertical Â line and the downward loping line
cross at the same point where 
W I
A ˆ









We first prove that H
efsL
fs cannot exist. In this equilibrium  ) 1 , 0 ( H   , 0 L    and
both  H and L(0,1). The equilibrium is constrained by the following five
conditions:
A RF  ”L- and H-type IR” (A2.1)
F B L L R ) R R ( p   ”L-type IC” (A2.2)
F B H H R ) R R ( p   ”H-type IC” (A2.3)
 ) A I ( h A ) h 1 )( 1 ( h ) 1 ( H L H H            (A2.4)
“Equality of supply and demand for funds”
and




fs (A2.1) holds with equality.  Solving (A2.4) for H yields
 ) h 1 ( h 1
hI
A
L H H        (A2.6)
Using (A2.3) and (A2.6) in (A2.5) yields RB as
I






Inserting (A2.7) back into (A2.3) gives36
I
A





F R  in (A2.8) is strictly larger than A, the initial assumption (A2.1) that the
agents’ IR constraints binds is invalid. This means that the equilibrium cannot
exist for positive H and L.
H
efL
f can be characterized by setting H = L = 0 in (A2.6). This means that
hI
A *
H   (A2.9)
Equation (A2.9) gives two equilibrium existence conditions:
hI A 1
*




H     (A2.11)
By means of (A2.7) and (A2.8) the third existence condition, the L-type IC







Equations (A2.10)–(A2.12) define the range of parameters for which H
efL
f exists.
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In this equilibrium,  1 H   , 0 L   , H = 0 and L(0,1). In words, all H-types are
entrepreneurs and L-types are either financiers or use the storage technology. The
five basic conditions constraining the equilibrium are
A RF  “L-type IR” (A3.1)
F B L L R ) R R ( p   “L-type IC” (A3.2)
F B H H R ) R R ( p   “H-type IC and IR” (A3.3)
) A I ( h A ) h 1 )( 1 ( L      (A3.4)
“Equality of supply and demand for funds”
and
) h 1 )( 1 ( R R hp L F B H     (A3.5)
“Financial market transactions”
The equilibrium value of RF trivially equals A by (A3.1). By substituting (A3.1)
into (A3.5), the other endogenous variables, L, and RB, can be solved from
(A3.4) and (A3.5). They are given by38













From (A3.6) we see that  1
*
L    by assumption A < I. Similarly, inserting (A3.1)
and (A3.7) into (A3.3) shows that H-types’ IC and IR constraints are equivalent to
pHRH > I which holds by assumption. Thus, H
eL




L     (A3.8)
must hold. Second, the L-type IC constraint (A3.2) must hold. Employing (A3.1)









where the right hand side equals (A1.10). Equations (A3.8) and (A3.9) show that
H
eL
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L-type IC
(C.10)







We first prove that H
efsL





efs of Appendix 1, because here H  (0,1), L = 1, H  (0,1) and L = 0. In
words, all L-types are entrepreneurs, and H-types are indifferent between




RF = A “L- and H-type IR” (A4.1)
pL(RL–RB)  RF, “L-type IC” (A4.2)
pH(RH–RB) = RF, “H-type IC” (A4.3)
 ) A I ( h h 1 hA ) 1 ( H H H          (A4.4)
“Equality of supply and demand for funds”,
and
 h ) 1 ( R R p ) h 1 ( p h H H F B L H H         (A4.5)
“Financial market transactions”40
An equation system consisting of (A4.1) and (A4.3)–(A4.5) determines the values









Upon substituting (A4.1) and (A4.6) into (A4.5) we have two equations (A4.4)
and (A4.5) that determine the remaining two endogenous variables, H, and H.









































































Equations (A4.7) and (A4.8) provide four equilibrium existence conditions:
 
 h 1 p




   
    (A4.9)
p
) R p I ( p
A 0
H L H *
H 
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    (A4.10)
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 

   
 
    (A4.12)
Since H-types’ IC and IR bind, and L-types’ IR is satisfied through their IC, the
L-type IC is the fifth equilibrium existence condition. It is satisfied if
A ˆ A  (A4.13)41
The equilibrium may exist between the vertical lines (A4.10) and (A4.11), which
is a nonempty set. However, the vertical line (A4.13) is smaller in value than the




10 To see this, let H = 0 in (A4.4) to get

hI




Substituting (A4.14) and (A4.3) for (A4.5) and letting H = 0 yields

 p h p I







Inserting (A4.15) back into (A4.3) gives
 
 p h p I
h 1 pI A p R p
R
L




From (A4.14) we see that  1
*
H    holds by our assumption that A  <  I. An
equilibrium existence condition is thus
 I h 1 A 0
*
H      (A4.17)
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Similarly, by means of (A4.15) and (A4.16) the L-type IC (A4.2) is given by




p h p W I
I A
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Conditions (A4.17)–(A4.19) define the range of parameters for which H
efL
e
exists. This is shown in the (A, h)-space in Figure A4.1.
                                                
10 Note that in H
efL










I                 A
h = 1
Conditions (A4.17)–(A4.19) practically mirror those of H
eL
ef described in Section
3.1. Equation (A4.17) defines the downward sloping h = 1–A/I diagonal that starts
from the (A = 0, h = 1) corner and ends in the (A = I, h = 0) corner. The L-type IC
constraint (A4.19) is a downward sloping line that cuts the h = 1–A/I diagonal at
the same point as the vertical ÂI/pLRL line. H-types’ IR constraint (A4.18) is a
monotonically downward sloping curve that starts from the (A = 0, h = 1) corner
and cuts the h = 1–A/I diagonal once. H-types’ IR and L-types’ IC constraints and
the vertical Â line cross at the same point at 
WI
A ˆ 1 h h 2 

   . In sum, H
efL
e
exists above the H-type IR curve (A4.18) and below the L-type IC line (A4.19).
This area exists in the upper-left corner of the (A, h)-space where A  [0, Â] and







We first prove that H
efsL
efs cannot exist for a non-trivial set of parameters. In this
equilibrium H  (0,1), L  (0,1), H  (0,1), L  (0,1). In words, all agents are
indifferent between entrepreneurship, financing, and using the storage technology.
The agents’ IR and IC constraints bind, ie, it must hold that
RF = A, “L- and H-type IR” (A5.1)43
PL(RL–RB) = RF, “L-type IC” (A5.2)
and
pH(RH–RB) = RF. “H-type IC” (A5.3)




































for which this equilibrium can exist. This means that only H
efL
ef (where




ef is constrained by the following five basic conditions:
RF  A, “L- and H-type IR” (A5.6)
pL(RL–RB) = RF, “L-type IC” (A5.7)
pH(RH–RB) = RF, “H-type IC” (A5.8)
      ) A I ( h h 1 A h 1 ) 1 ( h ) 1 ( H L L H             (A5.9)
“Equality of supply and demand for funds”
and
     B H H L L F L H R h p h 1 p R h 1 ) 1 ( h ) 1 (            (A5.10)
“Financial market transactions”
Equation system (A5.7)–(A5.10) determines the values of the endogenous
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Substituting (A5.11) and (A5.12) into (A5.10) and solving (A5.9) and (A5.10) for






























1 H H *
L (A5.14)
Equations (A5.13) and (A5.14) yield four equilibrium existence conditions:














H     (A5.16)
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 (A5.18)
From equations (A5.6)–(A5.8) we see that agents’ IC constraints bind and IR
constraints are satisfied if
A ˆ A  (A5.19)
This is the fifth equilibrium existence condition. However, we see that if condition
(A5.19) holds, (A5.16) also holds. The equilibrium is thus defined by equations
(A5.15), and (A5.17)–(A5.19). Since (A5.17) is identical to (A4.19) we know that45





   as defined in Section 4 of
the appendix. This means that when h is large, ie, h   [h2, 1],  the  downward
sloping line (A5.17) and the vertical line (A5.18) are the binding constraints. For




h  , the binding constraints are the vertical lines





  as defined in Appendix 1,
the binding constraints are (A5.15) (which is identical to (3.13)) and (A5.19). For













 IÂ  
PHRH
I                 A
h = 1
In Figure A5.1 we illustrate how in terms of the (A, h)-space, H
efL
ef exists in a
parallelogram between the vertical lines (A5.18) and (A5.19) and the downward
sloping lines (A5.15) and (A5.17). This parallelogram exists for
A  (ÂI/pHRH, Â) and h  [h1, 1].BANK OF FINLAND DISCUSSION PAPERS
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